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#16

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST

PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

21 APRIL 1971

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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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Confidential

21 APRIL 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 16)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 APRIL 1971

Moscow (2767 items)

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|-----|
| CPSU Congress | (88%) | 40% |
| Indochina | (4%) | 11% |
| 10th Anniversary | (1%) | 7% |
| Gagarin Space Flight | | |
| Middle East | (3%) | 5% |
| China | (1%) | 1% |

Peking (1800 items)

| | | |
|---------------------------------|--------|-----|
| Domestic Issues | (44%) | 33% |
| Indochina | (19%) | 23% |
| Table Tennis World Tournament | (15%) | 14% |
| [U.S. Team in PRC] | (0.2%) | 2% |
| Korean Supreme Peoples Assembly | (--) | 8% |
| East Pakistan Rebellion | (7%) | 5% |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 16 April interview with a panel of newsmen at the Washington meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) is seized upon by Hanoi and the Front as further evidence of his unwillingness to set a deadline and withdraw all troops from Vietnam so that a settlement can be reached. A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 19th is notably disparaging. It says that the President, "ever since the launching of the military operation in southern Laos, has contracted the disease of talking volubly: He talks in an attempt to justify a too erroneous military and political adventure and a too obvious failure. He talks in an attempt to appease the anger and indignation which are spreading widely among the American people."

Vietnamese communist media continue to appraise the "defeat" of the February-March allied operation in Laos, and another article by a DRV military commentator presses the line that the "liberation" forces are able to fight large-scale battles. Consistent with communist claims of victory in the Laos campaign, Hanoi and Front propaganda ridicules President Thieu's 17 April speech in Hue lauding allied achievements in Lam Son 719. Attention to current fighting in South Vietnam centers on action in the highlands, with Hanoi press editorials on the 17th highlighting the battles around ARVN Fire Base 6.

Moscow echoes Vietnamese communist media in complaining that the President refuses to set a deadline for total withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and in fact intends to remain in Indochina "indefinitely." In the wake of the CPSU congress, Moscow continues to point to Soviet-DRV solidarity, and broadcasts assail Peking for ignoring the congress and the appeals from "various" communist countries for joint action in support of Indochina.

HANOI SAYS PRESIDENT'S 16 APRIL INTERVIEW SHOWS AGGRESSIVENESS

President Nixon's interview with newsmen at the ASNE meeting draws standard propaganda from Hanoi and the Front which scores his refusal to agree to a deadline for total U.S. withdrawal.*

* The President's 7 April TV speech also drew only routine radio and press comment. See the TRENDS of 14 April, pages 1-4.

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Comment also uniformly assails the President's statement that some U.S. troops will remain in South Vietnam until all U.S. prisoners are released and the South Vietnamese are capable of defending themselves.

Initial reaction came in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 17th. VNA and Liberation Radio comment came later that day. Statements by the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris, issued on the 17th, were carried respectively in VNA and LPA accounts on the following day. The only press comment is the NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 19th, broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service and summarized by VNA. Front comment includes a 20 April LPA Commentator article which says that the only difference between the President's 16 April remarks to newsmen and his 7 April TV speech is "more truculence, more obduracy."

The initial Hanoi radio broadcast noted that the President answered questions on both international and domestic problems, but it discussed only his remarks on Indochina. It stated that although the President "did not boast about the imaginary victories" of Vietnamization and the recent operations in southern Laos, he still repeated old arguments that reflected his "stubborn and warlike stand." It complained that he not only refused to set a deadline for a U.S. withdrawal but repeated "the unreasonable demand that both sides withdraw their troops." There is no acknowledgment that the President's reference to mutual withdrawal came in the course of his recollection that his 7 October proposal suggested withdrawal within 12 months, provided that both sides withdraw. The radio commentary, unlike subsequent reaction to the interview, acknowledged the President's reference to a further troop withdrawal announcement with the completion of the withdrawal of the scheduled 100,000 next fall. It said that in order "to soothe public opinion," the President "could not help promising that he would announce a withdrawal of an additional contingent of U.S. troops by the end of the year."

The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 19th, stridently critical of the President, sets forth what it calls three "lies" that the President has propagated: that he is ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, that the goal of the United States is to help the Vietnamese people develop a capacity for self-defense, and that he is interested in negotiations at Paris. In the latter regard commentator says the President's 16 April comments "amply proved that he is bent on seeking a military victory and on using the Paris conference as a propaganda rostrum."

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NHAN DAN's Commentator also acknowledges the President's statement that U.S. airpower will continue to be used until the prisoners are released. The article goes on to say that "more despicable still," he threatened the DRV with continued air strikes. The radio commentary of the 17th says that he defended "his wicked scheme of preparing for new military adventures, especially the acts of war against the DRV." Of available comment, only a VNA commentary of the 17th notes his "boast" that he also "had a number of cards to play." VNA, however, plays the remark in low key, interpreting it only as a "threat to bomb North Vietnam and prolong the presence" of U.S. troops in the South.

Both the VNA commentary and the NHAN DAN article note the President's comment that the North Vietnamese treatment of prisoners was the "most barbaric" of any nation. NHAN DAN says that

such name calling is very base and does not become a U.S. President. Nixon must have forgotten that it is he who is harboring Calley, the notorious murderer, and it is he himself who is ordering the wanton air strikes on populous areas the length and breadth of Indochina. What Nixon is actually doing only makes his words sound more hollow and ridiculous.

NHAN DAN declares that whether or not American prisoners will be released depends entirely on the United States, since the PRG's eight-point peace program provides that if the United States declares its willingness to withdraw by 30 June, then the release of prisoners as well as the safety of the withdrawing forces could be discussed.

PARIS: PRESIDENT'S TV SPEECH SCORED, PEACE "CONDITIONS" SET

At the 109th session of the Paris peace talks on 15 April, there was further criticism of President Nixon's 7 April speech in which he announced that 100,000 more troops would be withdrawn. As at the 8 April session, the communist delegates denounced the President for refusing to set a date for the complete withdrawal of troops and charged that the United States intends to occupy South Vietnam indefinitely. In this context both PRG Foreign

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Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and DRV representative Xuan Thuy--attending the talks for the first time since 25 February--scored Secretary Laird's "brazen statements," made at a 13 April Pentagon press conference, to the effect that U.S. naval and air forces would remain in Southeast Asia after the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

Xuan Thuy posed the question: If Vietnamization is successful, as the President says, "then why does he not pull out troops still more rapidly or pull them out completely in a short period of time?" Both delegates suggested that the withdrawal announcement was prompted by "heavy pressure" from the American public. And Thuy said that the speech also aimed "at minimizing the bitter defeats" of the U.S.-GVN forces in southern Laos.

Both the VNA and LPA accounts of this session duly report Mme. Binh's reassertion that if the United States cannot withdraw all its troops before 30 June as called for in the PRG's eight-point proposal, "it may propose another appropriate time limit and we will examine it." The VNA account also reports Xuan Thuy's enunciation of "three conditions" that must be met if the United States wants serious negotiations: The United States must agree to withdraw totally by 30 June or fix another reasonable time limit for consideration by all parties; it must "respect its commitment to completely and unconditionally stop all bombardments against the DRV and encroachments on her sovereignty and security"; and it must accept the PRG's proposal regarding the formation in Saigon of an administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem--an administration "standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy that will engage in serious negotiations with the PRG."

The VNA account of the allied delegates' remarks says cryptically that the "U.S. and Saigon puppet representatives rehashed the same aggressive, obdurate, and perfidious allegations that Nixon had resorted to in his April address."

HANOI MEDIA PUBLICIZE U.S. ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

Vietnamese communist propaganda on the "spring antiwar offensive" in the United States is highlighted by messages to the U.S. "antiwar fighters" from Hoang Minh Giam, chairman of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the

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American People, and PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh. As publicized by VNA on the 17th, Giam's message expresses "warm sympathy" with the antiwar campaign; Mme. Binh, according to LPA on the 21st, wished the demonstrators "splendid victories" in their spring movement. The LPA account did not include her further remarks--carried in VNA's service transmission from Paris to Hanoi on the 20th--that she "hoped the antiwar movement . . . will further coordinate its activities so that it will be effective" in demanding that the Nixon Administration negotiate seriously.

Such messages and letters from Vietnamese communist personalities and organizations are standard fare. For example, they were issued at the time of the May 1970 demonstrations protesting the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and at the time of the demonstrations in October and November 1969. High-level DRV support of the 15 October Vietnam Moratorium Day was tendered in a message from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong.*

Promptly on the 20th, Hanoi media reported the first of a number of activities planned by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, but so far there is no comment. On the 17th, however, Hanoi radio did devote a commentary to the antiwar movement in Congress, predicting that antiwar sentiment will spread even more if the President continues his current policy. At the same time, Hanoi news items have taken note of various calls by congressmen for a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

* For documentation of previous Vietnamese communist attention to antiwar demonstrations in the United States, see the TRENDS of 13 May 1970, pages 1-4; 15 October 1969, pages 1-4; 22 October, pages 6-7; 13 November, pages 10-11; and 19 November, pages 2-5.

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DRV ARTICLE ANALYZES REASONS FOR "DEFEAT" OF LAM SON 719

Hanoi's continuing propaganda on Operation Lam Son 719, includes an article by military commentator Trung Dung which analyzes the factors contributing to the communist "victory" in the Laos campaign. The article is broadcast by Hanoi radio on 18 April and reportedly is published in the April issues of the party journal HOC TAP and the army journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.*

The Trung Dung article falls in line with the 2 April article by Chien Binh (Combatant)** which used the Laos campaign to demonstrate the importance of "big campaigns of annihilation." While Trung Dung does not repeat Chien Binh's flat assertion that the annihilation of large segments of enemy forces is necessary to final victory, he does, like Chien Binh, stress the success of the "liberation" forces in fighting "big annihilating battles." The Trung Dung article also parallels Chien Binh in raising the issue of a communist military victory: it asserts that "if Nixon and company persist in seeking to achieve military victory with their Vietnamization-of-the-war strategy, the U.S. puppets cannot avoid being militarily defeated because of this reckless strategy."

In analyzing factors which he claims contributed to the "victory" on Highway 9, Trung Dung stresses the growth of the communists' ability to launch such large-scale campaigns. He claims that the liberation forces have developed "by leaps and bounds in every respect" and have made important progress in coordinating the fighting of different branches of the armed services and in "launching large-scale combat to annihilate battalions, brigades, and regiments." He also praises their ability to combine "local" and "mobile" forces to

* The July 1970 HOC TAP carried an article by Trung Dung on the military situation in Indochina in the wake of the allied incursion into Cambodia, and the March issue of the journal last year published an article by him reviewing the development of the battlefield situation since the 1968 Tet offensive. The May and April 1969 issues of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine carried articles by Trung Dung on the new phase of the war begun with the Tet offensive and on guerrilla warfare.

** See the 7 April TRENDS, pages 1-3.

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"create a general strength able to stage big annihilating battles." According to Trung Dung, the Laos victories also marked "important progress and great achievements" in organization and "in insuring logistics and technological support for a large-scale operation with large troop concentration on a mountainous battlefield despite the enemy's fierce harassment."

The article repeatedly praises the leadership of the "liberation" forces and says that the forces correctly assessed their own "strong and victorious" position and the allies' "defeated, weak, and precarious" position. The allied leadership is deprecated as being "subjective, adventurous, and passive."

COMMUNIST POSITION VIEWED AS FAVORABLE; THIEU SPEECH DERIDED

The military situation in Indochina in the wake of Lam Son 719 is analyzed in a 15 April NHAN DAN editorial which reiterates the view that the allies suffered a strategically significant defeat in the operation. The editorial cites recent action in the South Vietnam highlands, Cambodia, and northern Laos as evidence that the communists' "victory" in the campaign on Highway 9 against Lam Son 719 has "created new, favorable conditions" for Indochinese revolutionaries and has created "serious difficulties" for the allies. NHAN DAN also sees recent action as "lucidly reflecting the offensive posture" of the Indochinese "revolutionary forces" and as exposing the failure of the Laos operation's effort to cut communist supply lines. On this latter point, it notes that the Western press has reported that recent fighting has demonstrated that "the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia are better equipped than they were previously and that they possess a great potential."

Recounting allied problems as a result of Lam Son 719, the editorial repeats communist claims to have wiped out a major part of the forces committed to the operation and maintains that losses among elite Saigon units cannot be quickly recouped and that the ARVN's strategic deployment is now "more vulnerable."

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RESPONSE TO
THIEU SPEECH

A Liberation Radio commentary on 18 April promptly reacts to President Thieu's speech the day before in Hue, at ceremonies awarding units which participated in Operation Lam Son 719. Thieu is derided for staging a "farce" in the face of the allied operation's "defeat." The broadcast alludes to President Thieu's reference to the possibility of South Vietnamese attacks on the North, to the need for more major operations by ARVN forces, and to the launching of Lam Son 720.* But it dismisses his statements as "verbal aggressiveness" aimed at "shoring up the morale of his remnant troops, who have not yet recovered their wits following the serious defeat in southern Laos." Commenting that Thieu's "morale-boosting effort was in vain," the Front radio quotes South Vietnamese Vice President Ky as remarking that a march to the North by South Vietnamese troops is "unrealizable."

This remark by Ky is also quoted in a 20 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article in the course of contrasting his recent statements with Thieu's speech. According to the army paper, Thieu was using the ceremony in Hue in preparation for the presidential elections while Ky is trying to make capital on the "Laos debacle" and blame Thieu. It says that Ky was "unmistakeably" alluding to Thieu when he scored politicians for "'spilling the blood of soldiers for political ends and even for building fortunes.'" Further quoting Ky as commenting that Vietnamization--"'if it means making South Vietnam strong, capable of defending itself'"--will take 15 or 20 years, the paper remarks that "this is a direct insult to Nixon himself who in his recent statements has made believe that Vietnamization had been a success."

DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS B-52 RAIDS, ARTILLERY STRIKES IN DMZ

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 17 April issued another protest in the continuing series of statements on U.S. air and artillery strikes on villages in the DMZ. The protest charges that from 13-15 April, U.S. aircraft, including B-52's

* The Liberation Radio commentary does not go on to acknowledge Western press stories which cited Gen. Abrams and other sources in saying that Lam Son 720 is centered in the A Shau valley of Thua Thien Province. Available communist battle reports have not noted any action in the A Shau valley.

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"conducted repeated bombings" against Huong Lap village, and that on the 13th, U.S. artillery south of the DMZ, "shelled" Vinh Son and Vinh Quang villages. It emphasized that "all three villages lie in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) belonging to DRV territory."

Earlier on the 10th, the foreign ministry spokesman had protested the alleged bombing of Huong Lap village by U.S. aircraft including B-52's and the shelling of Vinh Son by U.S. artillery located south of the DMZ from 5-9 April. In standard fashion both statements "strongly denounced and severely condemned these acts of war" and demanded an end "for good" of all U.S. encroachments upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.

Hanoi radio on 15 April announces that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed that day over Haiphong bringing the DRV total of claimed U.S. planes to 3,389.

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MOSCOW SCORES PRESIDENT'S PURSUIT OF WAR, NOTES LAM SON 720

Moscow propagandists continue to complain that the Administration refuses to set a deadline for total withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam and intends instead to remain in Indochina "indefinitely." However, Moscow gives President Nixon's 16 April interview with newsmen at the ASNE meeting short shrift, with limited low-level attention. The initial standard TASS report, on the 17th, says that although the President acknowledged that the Vietnam war is "very difficult," he confirmed that the United States will continue the "old course." "Contrary to demands by the American public," says TASS, he again refused to set a deadline for troop withdrawal and even added that it would be necessary to retain air power and some residual forces in Indochina "for an indefinite period of time." Moscow radio foreign-language reports add that he indicated that the United States will continue to bomb the DRV. TASS also briefly reports the comments by the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris and in the NHAN DAN article, including its assertion that the President is trying to drag out the war indefinitely and find a "military solution" and that he regards the Paris talks as a "forum for propaganda."

A domestic service commentary on the 20th says that in his interview the President elaborated on a final U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, as outlined in his 7 April speech. Noting that he said that troops would remain until South Vietnam could defend itself, and until the POW issue was settled, the commentary says that even the American press notes the "biased nature" of these "conditions." It cites the New York TIMES' James Reston for the observation that nobody knows when the Saigon regime will become viable, and that the way to solve the problem of prisoners is to settle the problem of ending the war. An English-language Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 20th, pegged to the interview but not discussing its content, stresses that the American public has come up against the President's "obvious reluctance to tell the American people the truth" about the Indochina war.

PRESIDENT'S TV SPEECH, Continuing Moscow comment on
LAIRD PRESS CONFERENCE President Nixon's 7 April speech
 includes an English-language
commentary by Aleksey Leontyev, on the 17th, which takes
issue with the President's argument that the announcement of
a deadline would encourage the enemy to obstruct a negotiated

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settlement. Leontyev describes such claims as "groundless" in light of the DRV and PRG stand that an announced deadline would make it possible to start immediate talks for a cease-fire, safe troop withdrawal, and release of American airmen. Leontyev adds that in fact if the United States agreed to fix a withdrawal date, "the Paris talks could be brought to a successful conclusion."

Moscow sees Secretary Laird's 13 April announcement that U.S. naval and air forces will remain in Southeast Asia after the ground troops leave as an indication of a U.S. intention to maintain an "indefinite" military presence in the area. A domestic service report on the 15th, for example, says that Laird's statement "obviously conflicts" with Washington's "persistent declarations" on its plans for the curtailment of its presence in that part of the world.

LAM SON 720 Moscow has given some low-level attention to Saigon's launching of Lam Son 720, with TASS on the 16th briefly reporting that it is being carried out in southern South Vietnam along the Laos border by 10,000 Saigon "puppet" troops and units of the 101st U.S. Airborne Division. On the 18th the domestic service reports General Abrams' statement that the operation may include another incursion into Laos, and a similar report appears in IZVESTIYA on the 19th. On the 20th, the domestic service cites an AFP dispatch reporting that the U.S. command in Saigon is maintaining "deep silence" on the operation, but adding that as yet the U.S.-Saigon troops have made no contact with the liberation forces.

A 19 April foreign language commentary on the operation includes a brief comment on the President's 16 April interview. Calling the operation a "new experiment" to test Vietnamization, the commentary points to "skepticism" among Americans over the fighting ability of South Vietnamese troops especially after the "rout" in Laos. It says that no matter how hard he tries, the President cannot remove this skepticism, and it notes that in his 16 April interview, the President "could not but bitterly confirm that the Indochina war was extremely hard indeed." The commentary says that in Lam Son 720, the Saigon troops are being sent into the A Shau Valley to gain control of a "patriots' support center" and then are to attempt a new invasion of Laos.

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MOSCOW CONTINUES STRESS ON AID TO DRV, ASSAILS PRC STAND

Continued propaganda on Soviet-DRV solidarity and Soviet aid includes reports of Brezhnev's 14 April meeting with VWP First Secretary Le Duan and the other members of the DRV delegation to the CPSU congress. The reports note that Le Duan thanked the Soviet Union for its "great, effective, and valuable aid," and invited the USSR to send a Soviet party-government delegation to the DRV this year--an invitation which Moscow "gratefully accepted."

Continuing criticism of China's stand in Moscow radio's Mandarin-language service includes a commentary on the 16th which complains that Peking has "deliberately avoided" any mention of the CPSU congress and of the fact that it was "permeated with an internationalist spirit" and "paid close attention to the struggle of the Indochinese people." The commentary adds that the Chinese continue to ignore appeals by communists of various countries for concerted action to force the U.S. aggressors to stop their actions in Indochina, and says that Peking's "splittist position" has harmed the national liberation movement in all of Southeast Asia.

A Mandarin-language broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on the 15th complains that Peking is concealing the CPSU congress resolution which reiterated Soviet support for the Indochinese peoples, and that it is unwilling to recognize the harm its anti-Soviet policy is causing to the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and especially to the Indochinese people's struggle. Like earlier propaganda, it points to U.S. press speculation on the significance of the timing of Peking's 17 March editorial article attacking the Soviets--in the wake of the Laos incursion. The commentary also brings up the visit to China of the U.S. table tennis team,* noting U.S. press interest in such Chinese "political appeasement" of the United States at a time when the United States is expanding aggression in Southeast Asia.

* See the Sino-U.S. Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion of Moscow's reaction to recent Sino-U.S. developments.

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CPSU MAY DAY SLOGAN CALLS DRV PARTY THE "MILITANT VANGUARD"

Moscow's May Day slogan greeting the Indochinese who are fighting against "the aggression of American imperialism for the freedom and independence of their countries" is now couched as a greeting to "the heroic Vietnamese people and their militant vanguard--the VWP--and to the courageous patriots of Laos and Cambodia." Last October the slogan, which had previously been directed only to the Vietnamese people, reflected the spread of the war in Indochina by referring to "the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

The current characterization of the VWP as the "militant vanguard" is consistent with Moscow's stress on its support for the DRV and on communist unity, particularly with the language of the 25 February Soviet Government statement protesting the Laos operation and U.S. "threats" to the DRV: That statement, in reaffirming Soviet support, reminded the world that the DRV is a member of the "socialist family."

The second slogan on Indochina, calling for "the cessation of the barbaric war in Indochina" and the "complete and unconditional withdrawal of all troops of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," is essentially unchanged from last October.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

CHOU SAYS U.S. TEAM OPENED DOOR TO "FRIENDLY CONTACTS"

Peking's practice of people's diplomacy with the American table tennis team ran its course without an intrusion of political propaganda, except for a discordant note from Shanghai which was not echoed in Peking media. NCNA's 14 April account of Chou En-lai's "friendly conversation" that day with five visiting table tennis delegations quoted him as telling the Americans that their visit "has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people" of the two countries. Carefully avoiding any reference to governmental relations, Chou expressed a belief that "such friendly contacts will be favored and supported by the majority of the two peoples." NCNA did not report the remark by Chou--as quoted by Western correspondents--that the visit had "opened a new page" in Sino-U.S. relations.

Peking has been noncommittal about possible Chinese visits to the United States. According to the NCNA account, members of teams from Colombia, Nigeria, "and other countries" said at the meeting they "expected Chinese sportsmen to visit their countries," eliciting from Chou thanks for the invitation and an assurance that the Chinese "will work for its realization." Peking has not mentioned President Nixon's 16 April remarks to newsmen about Sino-U.S. relations, including exchanges of visits, and has maintained its complete silence on the series of U.S. measures to ease restrictions on relations with the PRC.

The only political note accompanying the American team's visit was sounded in a live Shanghai radio broadcast of matches played in that city on 15 April. The announcer cited Mao as teaching the need for distinguishing between the American people and their government. This differentiation had also been made prior to the U.S. team's arrival in the PRC in an 8 April NCNA feature on the world table tennis tournament in Japan. NCNA's report on the Shanghai matches, as in Peking media's coverage of the rest of the U.S. team's tour, did not refer to the U.S. Government.

Peking's invitation to the table tennis teams carries forward the momentum of its campaign to enhance its standing in the world community at a time of widespread reappraisal of the

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China question.* Its propaganda treatment of the American team's visit suggests an effort to clear the atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. relations while avoiding comment on bilateral political issues. Peking is on record, in authoritative comment last June marking the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan, as stating that Taiwan remains the crucial issue in Sino-U.S. relations. At that time, Huang Yung-shong reiterated the **principles underlying Peking's** approach to the Warsaw talks that had been cited in the PRC's November 1968 statement offering to resume the talks with the incoming Administration. He declared that a relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations was "out of the question" until the United States agreed to withdraw its forces from Taiwan and to "cease interference in China's internal affairs." Also at that time, Peking derided the President's call for improved Sino-U.S. relations as a trick to deceive public opinion.

JAPAN The Taiwan question and other key issues have figured in current Chinese comment on Japan. While Peking avoided political comment in connection with the American table tennis team's visit, its coverage of the Chinese team's stay in Japan continued to include polemical thrusts against both Japanese and U.S. policies. NCNA on the 13th, for instance, reported a party for the PRC team held in Osaka the previous evening which was sponsored by "Japanese advocates of Japan-China friendship." A Japanese trade union official was quoted as saying the Chinese team's visit had inspired the Japanese people in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism" and "the revival of Japanese militarism." He added an attack on the "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" formulas for resolving the Taiwan question. An NCNA dispatch from Japan on the 19th quoted a Chinese team member as saying after matches the previous day that the Chinese support the Japanese people's "patriotic and just struggle" against U.S. imperialism.

A Japanese team was not included among the teams arriving in the PRC after the world tournament. In the context of Peking's propaganda accompanying the Chinese team's extended visit in

*Concurrent with the teams' visits, Peking welcomed the sister of the Shah of Iran for a visit at the invitation of the PRC Government. At a banquet he gave for the Princess on the 14th, Chou En-lai fondly reminisced about the spirit of Bandung while avoiding any polemics against the United States, apart from a reference to the recent negotiations between the oil exporting countries and "the Western imperialist oil monopoly consortiums."

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Japan, this suggests that one of Peking's purposes has been to fuel fears among the Japanese that they are being left behind what Peking hopes is a bandwagon moving in the PRC's direction. Peking's practice of people's diplomacy toward the Japanese has been characterized by an effort to isolate the Sato government and to play on growing sentiment for the establishment of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations.

OTHER COUNTRIES While Peking avoided polemical propaganda in covering the foreign teams' visit to the PRC, political relations were reflected in its treatment of the various teams. In his conversation with the teams Chou mentioned to the Canadians and the Nigerians that their countries had recently established diplomatic relations with the PRC; and both these countries were favored by a visit to their teams by Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the National Peop. 's Congress. These two countries have agreed to exchange ambassadors with the PRC.

The ranking Chinese official to visit the British team was Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. Though there have been signs of improved PRC-British relations recently, representation remains at the charge d'affaires level.

PEKING HAILS AFRO-AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO "FASCIST RULE"

As expected, Peking has not passed up opportunities for propaganda attacks on U.S. policies even while observing constraints in the exercise of people's diplomacy. The third anniversary on 16 April--the day before the U.S. team's departure from the PRC--of Mao's statement in connection with the assassination of Martin Luther King occasioned propaganda calling for violent resistance by Afro-Americans against "the fascist rule of the U.S. Government." The anniversary was marked by a PEOPLE'S DAILY article attributed to two PLA men and an NCNA correspondent's article on the 16th, followed the next day by an NCNA report detailing recent Afro-American protests. Last year's anniversary was also marked with a PEOPLE'S DAILY article by a PLA man; in 1969 there was a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

Comment on the anniversary follows standard lines in preaching "armed resistance" and citing King's assassination as a negative lesson on the futility of "the creed of nonviolence and reformism." Characteristically, Peking uses the occasion to play up protest movements among U.S. minorities and to view

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these movements as part of "the anti-U.S. struggle of the oppressed people and nations of the world." According to the NCNA article, "many black pioneers" have discovered a powerful ideological weapon in Marxism-Leninism and have learned the necessity of integrating the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the specific conditions" in the United States in order to achieve victory. The 1969 editorial, at a time when Maoist evangelism was still running high, had formulated the universal truth as "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought."

This year's PEOPLE'S DAILY article is somewhat less harsh on the Nixon Administration than last year's. Where the latter belabored the President for playing his predecessors' dual tactics "in a more cunning and sinister way," this year's article limits itself to the observation that "the Nixon Administration is terror-stricken and completely at a loss, acting like an ant placed on a hot pan." However, the companion NCNA article picks up last year's claim that since President Nixon's advent to power "the U.S. ruling circles have intensified their fascist suppression of the Afro-American people, while continuing their political frauds."

MOSCOW EXPRESSES MISGIVINGS OVER SINO-U.S. DEVELOPMENTS

While Moscow has refrained from direct comment in its central media on recent Sino-U.S. developments, misgivings and insinuations have been conveyed in selective quotation from the Western press and in radio propaganda reflecting concern over implications for the triangular relationship. In addition, Moscow's position has been supported by a substantial output of comment from its East European allies, except for the independent-minded Romanians.

Moscow has tailored its reaction with an eye toward Hanoi and Pyongyang, the two capitals which Chou En-lai has visited in the past year and major targets in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. That Hanoi and Pyongyang are less than pleased with recent Sino-U.S. developments is indicated by their failure to report the American table tennis team's visit to the PRC. Seizing the opportunity to press its line of questioning Peking's anti-imperialist credentials, Moscow has made a point of insinuating to the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans that the PRC is accommodating itself to the United States at their expense.

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Thus, a 15 April TASS report on the White House announcement the previous day easing restrictions on relations with the PRC noted that the changes do not affect shipping to the DRV, the DPRK, and Cuba--"that is, to the states that are waging an active struggle against American imperialism." TASS pointedly cited the American press as linking Washington's new moves with the PRC's recent stand regarding Cambodia and Laos, thus implying that Washington is rewarding the Chinese for failing to take a stronger position on Indochina.

TASS also cited an element of Chinese reciprocity. After noting Chou's meeting with the Americans in Peking and pointing out that NCNA publicized his remarks, TASS quoted the New York TIMES as saying that Chou's statement about a new page being opened in Sino-U.S. relations "rendered Nixon a service" by being timed to coincide with preparations for antiwar demonstrations. The TASS dispatch, published in the Soviet press on the 16th, was broadcast to the Vietnamese and the Chinese, among others.

Another TASS dispatch, datelined New York on the 18th, cited the TIMES' appraisal of the warm reception given to the Americans and Chou's remarks as a great achievement of the Nixon Administration's foreign policy which the President can publicize in the next election. The TIMES was also quoted as saying the Administration's motives extend beyond tactical considerations and encompass the Nixon doctrine, described by TASS as the banner under which "U.S. imperialism wages the aggressive war against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." The President believes that the success of this doctrine largely depends on at least the tacit support of the Chinese, the dispatch concludes.

Similar insinuations figure in selected foreign comment rounded up in LITERARY GAZETTE on 14 April under a heading "An Unexpected Friendly Gesture." For example, the Washington POST is quoted as saying the invitation to the American table tennis team is the first indication since the incursion into Cambodia that Peking is ready to move forward in improving Sino-U.S. relations while the fighting in Indochina continues. LITERARY GAZETTE also has a message for the North Koreans, citing unnamed foreign commentators in Peking as noting that Chinese table tennis players competed against the South Korean team although Peking declares that it does not recognize the Seoul regime.

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Directly below that report, LITERARY GAZETTE printed a satirical item drawing on a Moslem folktale and citing Radio Israel as stating that the PRC has a sympathetic attitude toward Israel's staunch anti-Soviet struggle. The moral of the story is that Peking's propaganda support for the Arabs belies its actual policy.

While Soviet central media have remained silent on the triangular relationship in assessing Sino-U.S. developments, this has been a major theme in comment broadcast to the Chinese. Some of this comment has touched on the sensitive subject of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in seeking to demonstrate a connection between Peking's anti-Soviet policies and Washington's initiatives. Thus, a Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on the 17th argued that Washington began its initiatives in consideration of the border clashes that erupted in the spring of 1969. Soviet comment has not, however, mentioned the Peking border talks in the triangular context.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW WELCOMES EGYPT-SYRIA-LIBYA FEDERATION DECLARATION

Moscow "receives with satisfaction" the 17 April declaration by Egypt, Syria, and Libya on the formation of a Federation of Arab Republics, playing up its "progressive, anti-imperialist content" in keeping with long-standing Soviet propaganda stress on the importance of Arab unity in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism and for socialist transformation of the Arab world. UAR Foreign Minister Riyad, arriving in Cairo after 15-20 April talks in Moscow with Gromyko, Kosygin, and others, was reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY as saying that news of the federation was "well received in all Soviet and friendly quarters in general."

The leaders of Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Sudan had met in Cairo on 13 April, but Sudan's an-Numayri left on the 14th for an unheralded visit to Moscow while the other three transferred their discussions to Benghazi, Libya, where the federation declaration was signed. Sudan has said it will join the federation later. The federation declaration is the latest in a series of unity moves initiated on 27 December 1969 with the Tripoli Charter, signed by Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, which looked toward cooperation and integration in achieving unified goals. Establishment of a union of these three states was announced on 8 November 1970 following a meeting in Cairo, with Syria joining the group on the 27th of November.*

Typifying Moscow's propaganda approach, a 19 April Arabic-language commentary on the federation declaration says the Soviet Union fully understands the Arabs' aspirations for unity and for joining their resources and energies to struggle against "aggressive plots by neocolonialism, imperialism, and its agents." Asserting that the USSR well understands the importance of a united, strong Arab front, the commentary

* In 1963, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had signed a unity statement--also on 17 April, the same date as the present Pengehazi declaration. While Moscow comment at that time was generally favorable, there were some veiled warnings against continued Arab intolerance of local communist activities.

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points to the May Day slogan addressing the Arab peoples to "strengthen unity and cohesion in the struggle against imperialist aggression."

As in comment after the November 1970 announcement, Moscow points to "strong reaction" from the United States and Israel, propagandists claiming that the two countries belittle the new federation by distorting the reasons for its establishment and predicting that it will soon disintegrate. Also as last November, Moscow points to the economic benefits, noting the natural resources and manpower available to the three countries. An Arabic-language commentary on the 20th observes that the "gradual integration" of the member states will permit better use of the resources of the "Arab liberation forces," and it adds that by consolidating and developing the federation "could become" an influential force in the anti-imperialist struggle. A Glukhov article in PRAVDA, reviewed in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th, underlines the "great potential" for cooperation among the states. There is as yet no hint of difficulties as reflected by Volskiy last fall, in a 13 November NEW TIMES article which observed that "of course, the strengthening of the alliance presents no few practical problems."

POLITICAL Soviet propaganda touches on the basic
SETTLEMENT principles of the federation, noting that
 it will form the nucleus of a united
socialist Arab society and that the main task is the liberation of occupied Arab territory. But Moscow has not acknowledged the "no's" of the Benghazi declaration--"no conciliation (sulh) and no negotiation, and not a single inch of occupied territory will be relinquished," and no bargaining over the Palestinian question.* There is the suggestion, as in Soviet propaganda last fall, that the establishment of the federation will not alter the search for a political

* The Benghazi "no's" differ from the Khartoum "no's," in the resolution of the Arab summit conference in Khartoum in August-September 1967, in that the former drops the "no recognition" while adding no territorial concessions. The Khartoum resolution specified no conciliation (sulh) with Israel, no recognition of it, and no negotiations with it, and also called for adherence to the Palestinian people's rights.

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settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus a Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 19th charges that "imperialist propaganda" views the Benghazi declaration as tantamount to relinquishing a peaceful political settlement. Rebutting this argument, Tsoppi says an Egyptian Government spokesman has announced that the UAR is prepared, "as in the past, to conclude a peace treaty with Israel." Tsoppi maintains that in light of a strong single Arab front, it will be more difficult for Israel to "sabotage a political settlement."

Last November Koryavin had commented in IZVESTIYA that establishment of the three-state federation opened wide prospects for the possibility of solving the crisis through peaceful political means, and Belyayev on a Moscow domestic service commentators' panel had stressed that the three states would act as a united force in the struggle for a political settlement.

DETAILS OF FEDERATION

Moscow points out that the federation's political system will be based on the principles of democracy and socialism, and that the federation will be open to Arab countries which believe in Arab unity and strive for the establishment of a "genuine socialist society." (TASS on the 19th cites Sudan's an-Numayri as saying that the adoption of a new constitution and the creation "of 'a strong public organization'" will be the basis on which Sudan will join the federation.)

Short TASS reports on the 18th citing UAR President as-Sadat's announcement of the federation mention that a committee will work out a draft constitution, and that referendums will be held in the three countries on 1 September, the second anniversary of the Libyan revolution. TASS also notes provisions for a national assembly and a supreme executive body, says the federation will have the joint command of the three countries' armed forces, and reports that agreements and treaties signed by the federation members will be honored. PRAVDA's Glukhov on the 19th provides further details of the federation document, including the fields that come under the competence of the federation, such as foreign policy, war and peace, and defense and security.

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UAR FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDES TALKS IN MOSCOW

TASS' 21 April "announcement" on UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's 15-20 April talks in Moscow follows established lines in reaffirming that peace can be established only on the basis of complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, full Israeli withdrawal, and insurance of Palestinian rights. TASS routinely praises the UAR's "constructive policy" on a political settlement, pointing to the "realistic approach" exemplified in Cairo's positive reply to Jarring's 8 February memorandum. At the same time, it assails the "obstructionist" policy of Israel, "supported by the United States," as demonstrated in its negative attitude to Jarring's proposals.

The two sides, TASS adds, agreed on unspecified "further joint steps" to normalize the Middle East situation. This language is reminiscent of the passage in the communique on Nasir's last visit to Moscow, last July, which said the sides discussed further steps to be taken to achieve a political settlement and declared for further coordination of efforts in this direction. Similarly, in the communique on Nasir's July 1968 Soviet visit, the sides "agreed on future joint steps" with regard to the Middle East situation "with a view to restoring peace and security" there.

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CASTRO SPEECH

Buoyed by the advent of Allende's regime in Chile in the wake of the governmental changes in Bolivia and Peru, Castro used his 10th Bay of Pigs anniversary speech on 19 April to portray "a revolutionary wave of radicalization which is sweeping the continent and seriously threatening imperialist domination." Calling the Bay of Pigs "one of the most self-defeating events in the 195 years of U.S. history," he took the occasion to revive emphasis on the notion of an association of revolutionary Latin American states to supplant the OAS, reiterated Cuba's lack of interest in joining the OAS as it is presently constituted, and ruled out any "normalization" of Cuban relations with the United States.

At some points directly and at others indirectly, Castro responded defiantly to remarks by President Nixon about Cuba's self-isolation by virtue of its continuing export of revolution. Declaring that the 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs was being celebrated at a time when Cuba "is no longer alone," he defined a Cuban policy of continued support for Latin American revolutionary "governments" and "movements"--"whatever is necessary," up to and including military support.

APPRAISES REVOLUTIONARY TRENDS, PROMISES CUBAN SUPPORT

Picturing a "qualitative change in the Latin American situation," Castro placed predictable emphasis on revolutionary trends in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia and in the process defined each country's standing in a scale of revolutionary progress.

CHILE He described Chile as "a country that is on the path of revolution, brothers in arms with our people, a people who are just beginning on the long and difficult struggle." In keeping with prior forecasts in Cuban propaganda that "reaction" would not take defeat lying down and might create difficulties that would provoke regime counteraction, he said the new Chilean regime will "logically encounter difficulties" and cited efforts by the usual culprits--the CIA, oligarchists, and reactionaries--to sabotage agricultural and industrial production and to execute various types of plots against the Popular Unity government.

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Avowing that "we are wholeheartedly on the side of the Chilean people, and we are ready to do whatever may be necessary for them" and "to demonstrate our solidarity in any field," Castro promised that even if Chile should be unable to export goods to Cuba--as the result of imperialist and counterrevolutionary sabotage--"it will not matter; the Chilean people will never lack sugar" because "we will continue to send our sugar to the Chilean people." Further, he expansively assured the Chileans that "if there should be an aggression from abroad, planned by imperialism, millions of Cubans will be ready to go to fight for Chile."

At the beginning of his speech Castro took note of the presence of Volodia Teitelboim, member of the Political Committee of the Chilean Communist Party's Central Committee, and he concluded the speech with an injunction to Teitelboim to tell the Chilean people, the Popular Unity, and Allende's government "that our people, unselfishly and in brotherhood with the spirit of Giron, say: When you need it you can count on our sugar, and when you need it you can count on our blood, and when you need it you can count on our lives."

PERU AND BOLIVIA Observing that "other Latin American countries are in convulsion," Castro dealt first with events in Peru. Citing specific actions of the Peruvian Government--cancellations of concessions, recovery of resources, and agrarian reform laws--he asserted that "a real change in that country's structures" is taking place and that although "one cannot speak about a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Peru, from the viewpoint of revolutionary theory one can speak objectively about a revolutionary process in Peru."

In Bolivia, where a "profound radicalization" is being observed among the Bolivian working, peasant, and student masses, Castro contended that "a revolutionary, convulsed, radicalized people" are demanding "a radical revolution." It is "our opinion," he said, "that a revolutionary process also exists in Bolivia." But he was explicitly noncommittal on the Bolivian Government, commenting that "with regard to the leadership of that process, we have not expressed our views." Cuban media's treatment of the Bolivian military regime has cooled noticeably after an initially cautious reaction to the accession of General Juan Torres to power on 7 October 1970.*

* See the TRENDS of 28 October 1970, pages 39-42.

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Summing up his view of the countries whose revolutionary or reformist regimes he portrayed as spearheading the new process of continent-wide "radicalization," Castro expressed confidence in "the Peruvian revolutionary process, in the Peruvian Government, in the Peruvian people"; in "the Chilean revolutionary process, in the Popular Unity movement, in the Chilean Government and people"; and, again pointedly excluding the Bolivian Government, in "the Bolivian workers, students, and peasants--our confidence in the Bolivian people."

URUGUAY, BRAZIL By contrast, Castro pictured "crises"
AND ARGENTINA in the political systems of Uruguay,
Argentina, and Brazil and mentioned the
"revolutionary fighters" in all three countries who are
"risking their lives in the underground and shedding their
blood fighting oppression."

In Argentina and Brazil, he said, the regimes have "exhausted the last methods, the last actions, the last weapons, to maintain a system" and have "reached a point considered the incubus of revolution." He described the decision by the "gorilla Lanusse" to take "direct charge of the government" in Argentina as a futile effort to forestall "a revolutionary solution for the Argentine people."

Castro was notably circumspect with regard to Uruguay, neither mentioning the urban-based guerrilla group, the Tupamaros, nor alluding to the efforts to form a leftist electoral coalition on the Chilean model with Uruguayan Communist Party participation. Cuban media have reported the move to develop the electoral front and have publicized the Tupamaros' highly qualified support for the idea. They have enthusiastically publicized the exploits of the Tupamaros; as recently as 14 January, Castro described them as "revolutionaries with a great political brain who undoubtedly have plenty of support among the masses" and who "act with responsibility." Cuban comment in the past has held up the Tupamaros as a model for other revolutionaries in South America's southern cone and has claimed that their "tactical concepts" had been influenced by the Cuban revolution.

CUBAN SUPPORT Promising Cuban "support to the revolutionary
 governments and also support of the
revolutionary movements of Latin America," Castro observed
that the Cuban armed forces have acquired broad technical

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knowledge and developed formidable educational institutions, predicting that "in this area, we will undoubtedly one day have the need to give technical aid to other revolutionary Latin American peoples, to give them our support, support of a technical nature." He pledged that "at the hour and moment that the other brother revolutionary countries request it, technical assistance, such as technicians or soldiers--such as soldiers, combatants--as our most sacred duty, we shall furnish them."

DENOUNCES OAS, ADVOCATES "UNION" OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES

Noting that some Latin American governments--he specified Chile's--have raised at the OAS meetings in Costa Rica "their condemnation of the aggression and the measures against Cuba," Castro was unequivocal in asserting Cuba's lack of interest in rejoining the OAS in its present form while absolving Chile of blame for working within the existing organization: "We believe that when the Chilean Government adopted the position of fighting it out with them there, it did the right thing, within its condition."

With reference to the sanctions against and censure of Cuba "by that court of bandits," Castro insisted that "morally we have never felt under censure. Morally, historically, they are the only ones under censure and, naturally, we have no intention of lifting--nor can anyone lift--these moral and historic sanctions against the imperialists and their cohorts. That is our position." He reiterated: "Now that we are outside, we feel perfectly well. We do not have to account to the imperialists, nor to the OAS." In apparent oblique response to President Nixon's recent remarks, in his February Report on U.S. Foreign Policy and during his 16 April interview with newspaper editors, on Cuba's self-isolation by virtue of its continued support for insurgency, Castro asked rhetorically:

How are they going to allow us into the OAS when we say we are on the side of the revolutionary governments? How, when we say that the OAS causes fits of vomiting in our country--that name of the OAS, that is? Furthermore, we say publicly that we have supported, we still support, and we shall continue to support the revolutionary movements of Latin America!

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While asserting again that "we do not belong nor shall we belong to the OAS" and that "historically the OAS has to disappear," Castro elaborated the notion of "a union of Latin American states" in preference to an "organization" of American states, adding that "for a union to exist, there first must be revolution in each of the Latin American countries." He explained that an economic and political "union" of the Latin American people is "a historic process," and he called on Latin American revolutionaries to "develop this internationalist or Latin Americanist sentiment as broadly as possible." He cited as examples Cuban blood given to the Peruvian people following the Peruvian earthquake and Cuban willingness "to fight together with our Chilean brothers."

IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT, REJECTS NORMALIZED TIES WITH U.S.

Responding to President Nixon's remarks on relations with Cuba in his "recent radio interview"--the 16 April interview with newspaper editors--Castro contended that the United States has "no right or basis to dream about any type of normalization of relations with Cuba and conciliation with Cuba." He argued that the President, "one of the fathers" of the Bay of Pigs invasion, was faced with "a desperate situation arising from the tremendous defeats inflicted in Indochina" and was "maneuvering internationally, seeking desperately to grasp something to save himself." As a result, "the old insolent and disrespectful language" was discarded, and the President "almost seemed to pine for a gesture from Cuba." Evoking a tacit contrast with Peking's behavior, Castro said such a gesture "will never be made."

Ticking off a long list of U.S. "responsibilities and debts toward our nation and our people" and toward many Latin American nations, Castro asked rhetorically: "What kind of normal relations or arrangements can there be between a revolutionary country such as Cuba" and "this Yankee imperialism, this genocidal government, this cop-like government, this aggressive government?" He asserted that reconciliation and normalizing of relations "with Mr. Nixon" would constitute "renouncing Cuba's solidarity with the revolutionary movements and peoples and governments," adding that "Cuba will not renounce this--we repeat this once more--will never renounce this solidarity."

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

On the eve of the 18th meeting of the four-power talks on Berlin, the Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 15 April carried the first acknowledgment in Soviet bloc media of the Soviet draft agreement on West Berlin presented at the previous meeting of the four ambassadors on 26 March--the first anniversary of the start of the current talks on Berlin.

The ZYCIE WARSZAWY release, in the form of an editorial commenting on information attributed to Belgian sources, has been given well-orchestrated distribution: PAP carried long excerpts on the 15th; East Berlin radios transmitted summaries and text the same day, and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published the text on the 16th; and TASS distributed the text on the 16th in both its English and Russian international services.

So far, no mention of the Warsaw paper's editorial or of the Soviet draft has appeared in the Soviet central press, although a discussion of the editorial has been broadcast by the Moscow domestic radio: The commentators' roundtable broadcast to Soviet audiences on 18 April included remarks by TASS foreign affairs editor Gennadiy Shishkin spelling out the main points of the Soviet draft as released by ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

WARSAW EXPLAINS PUBLICITY FOR SOVIET DRAFT ON WEST BERLIN

Attributing its information to "reliable political circles in Brussels," the ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial prefaced an outline of the Soviet draft with an apparent explanation of why Poland was leaking the contents of the document on the eve of the 18th meeting: Unnamed political observers, it said, were pinning "definite hopes" on this meeting, at which the Western allies were expected to respond to the Soviet proposal. In an obvious attempt to indicate a division among the Western allies, the editorial went on to note that "one" of the Western ambassadors had received the Soviet draft "very warmly."

In a more explicit explanation of the timing of its publicity for the Soviet draft, all but ignoring the editorial's attribution of the information to Brussels "political circles," ZYCIE WARSZAWY published on the 17th--the day after the 18th meeting of the four ambassadors--an article by its correspondent Derlatka asserting that prior to the meeting the Western side had "circulated rumors" that the Soviet proposals were

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"unsatisfactory" and that the Big Three were "disappointed by the progress of the talks." Derlatka said observers in West Berlin believed the ZYCIE WARSZAWY's public discussion of the Soviet draft had "made it impossible for the Americans to carry out a maneuver" to secure a "longer summer break" before the 19th meeting.

Also in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 17th, Ryszard Wojna noted that the Soviet proposals, as publicized in the editorial on the 15th, had "aroused lively interest" in many countries and that the first reactions in Bonn in particular "fully confirmed the reliability and accuracy" of the information in the editorial. Citing a reported remark by FRG Government spokesman von Wechmar to the effect that Bonn "deplored" the publication of the Soviet draft in the Polish paper, Wojna remarked, according to PAP, that it is difficult to understand this reaction because for weeks the Western press had been publishing "inspired articles" on the Soviet position on West Berlin and presenting "a distorted picture" of it. This type of "misinforming" was not deplored by Bonn, Wojna continued, and the "regrets" only came when the Soviet Union took "a constructive approach out of the desire to reach an understanding."

Seeking to discredit Western press speculation that the Big Three had refrained from divulging the Soviet proposals so as to avoid locking the USSR in on a public position, Wojna remarked that the real purpose had been to extract "something of much greater importance" from the USSR. The "present disappointment" with the disclosure of the Soviet draft, he said, reflects concern that such Western tactics might fail. He concluded that the ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial had "spoiled the game of certain anti-Soviet forces" and "served well the climate of negotiations."

MOSCOW COMMENTATOR CALLS DRAFT AGREEMENT "SUBSTANTIAL STEP"

Moscow radio, though not the Soviet press, has commented directly on the Soviet position on West Berlin since the appearance of the Polish editorial and has joined Warsaw in rationalizing the release of the contents of the previously confidential Soviet draft agreement. In a broadcast to German listeners on the 18th, Yuriy Sibirtsev maintained that Western propaganda had been trying to put the Soviet position at the four-power talks in a "bad light." Asserting that the USSR had been accused of "cruelty and relentlessness and of rejecting

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all conditions' advanced by the Big Three, Sibirtsev said that those who resort to such "tricks obviously want to exert pressure and to shake the principles of the Soviet Union" in the West Berlin negotiations. Such calculations are an "illusion," he continued, and "no one has won any laurels by using pressure tactics on the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it has always turned into a boomerang for those who threw it."

Sibirtsev expressed the Soviet Union's "conviction" that it is possible to reach an agreement on West Berlin and to conclude the negotiations successfully if "the parties to the negotiations respect the allied agreements stipulating the special status of West Berlin and also recognize the sovereignty of the GDR as an independent socialist state"--the now current formulation on West Berlin introduced by Brezhnev in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress. Similarly, TASS foreign affairs editor Gennadiy Shishkin, participating on the Moscow domestic service roundtable program on the 18th, stated that the Soviet Union bases its West Berlin stand on this formulation.

Directly citing the ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial on the "constructive" Soviet proposals regarding West Berlin, Shishkin said the Soviet draft demonstrates that "a realistic possibility for the settlement of the West Berlin question does exist." He went on to outline the "concrete" Soviet proposals on West Berlin, noting the stipulations that West Berlin is neither a part of the FRG nor administratively subordinated to it; that West Berlin and West Germany may continue their "extensive links with the exception of purely political relations" (described by Shishkin as "a very substantial step toward satisfying the wishes of the Western powers"); and that the "key problem," as viewed by the Western powers, of "civilian movement between West Berlin and West Germany" can be solved by reaching an agreement on "interference-free transit movement on the basis of accepted international standards"--by implication, movement acceptable to the GDR.

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FRG - POLAND

WARSAW SAYS MOSCOW TREATY SHOULD BE FIRST ONE RATIFIED

An article by Ryszard Wojna in the Polish Government organ ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 17 April seemed responsive primarily to a statement by FRG Government spokesman von Wechmar on the 15th to the effect that "obviously authorized" Polish diplomatic sources in Stockholm had indicated Poland wanted an early, separate ratification of the Warsaw-Bonn treaty ahead of the FRG treaty with Moscow. Wojna denied "concoctions" of this kind as "naive and not serious."

As reviewed by PAP, the article addressed itself to the Western press speculation that Poland wanted ratification of its treaty with the FRG to go forward regardless of the holdups on ratification of the Moscow treaty, pending a West Berlin settlement. Wojna pointed out that it was not Poland or the Soviet Union that had sought to link the results of the West Berlin negotiations with ratification of the two treaties; the linkage had been made "unilaterally" by the FRG Government. Warsaw "appreciates the importance" that a settlement of the West Berlin problem would have in promoting European detente, Wojna said, but it regards ratification of the Warsaw treaty with Bonn as an "integral part" of the settlement and normalization of relations between the socialist bloc and Bonn--a process that "began with the Moscow treaty."

In his report on the CPSU congress to the ninth PZPR Central Committee plenum on 16 April, First Secretary Gierek touched only briefly on the issue of ratification of the two treaties with Bonn, stressing that Poland is ready to honor its commitments deriving from the Warsaw-Bonn treaty just as the USSR is prepared to carry out its obligations in the Soviet-FRG accord. Gierek added that progress in the normalization of relations with Bonn "depends entirely on the FRG's stand and, above all, on ratification" of the two treaties.

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ALBANIA

ZERI I POPULLIT SCORNS BREZHNEV OFFER OF NORMALIZED RELATIONS

A lengthy article in the Albanian party organ ZERI I POPULLIT on 18 April uses the 24th CPSU Congress as an occasion to recapitulate Tirana's catalogue of complaints against the Soviet leadership while reacting scornfully to Brezhnev's brief statement in his congress report that Moscow is interested in the restoration of normal relations with Tirana. Commenting on Brezhnev's offer, the paper says:

Certainly we cannot prevent him from speaking of relations with our country. But if the Soviet revisionists think that through such tactics they will make us wait for "new positive developments" on their part and stop the polemic and the struggle against revisionism, we say to them that they have gone to the wrong house. Our revolutionary vigilance against their diabolic maneuvers has been and always will be at due height.

After quoting earlier statements by party chief Hoxha rejecting any rapprochement with the Soviets, the article asserts that renormalization of relations between the Soviet Union and socialist Albania is not a mere question which can be settled with a false statement by a Soviet revisionist leadership which has adopted a hostile stand and threatens our country." The article registers Tirana's intransigence regarding Soviet appeals for normalization with a contemptuous retort that "not a single word can be said about such an undertaking" until "genuine Bolsheviks" are in power in the Soviet Union.

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO THREATENS PURGE TO UNIFY PARTY RANKS, PROMOTE REFORMS

Indications that a showdown between the Yugoslav central government and dissident republican party officials may be in the offing appeared in two bitter and blunt speeches delivered by President Tito in the autonomous province of Kosovo on 15 April and in the Serbian town of Nis on the 16th.* According to TANJUG, Tito said that Yugoslavia has reached "a turning point" in its history and threatened to purge those communists who are causing disunity in the ranks and trying to thwart the pending governmental reorganization. Announcing in the Kosovo speech that he would shortly convene a meeting of the party Presidium and republican leaders, he added: "We shall not leave the meeting until we all agree."

Although in both speeches Tito still stopped short of openly attacking republican party barons by name, he threatened to expose "hostile elements" if they do not stop trying to exploit the situation and undermine national unity. By applying such psychological pressure on quarreling party factions, Tito apparently hopes to bring them into line at the planned Presidium session without having to resort to public denunciations of republican party leaders--a course that could exacerbate what Tito himself portrayed in his Kosovo speech as unprecedented disunity within the League of Communists.

Throughout his tour of the provinces Tito has been critical of all those whom he believes are trying to exploit the reforms for their own parochial interests, but in his speech at Kosovo he seemed to express particular chagrin over the behavior of the Croats, the most outspoken advocates of republican autonomy. He observed that "there are some people who, to be factual, by invoking the amendments, aim at closing themselves within their own

* See 14 April FBIS TRENDS, pages 37-40, for a discussion of earlier speeches made during Tito's tour of the provinces in which he has sought to drum up support for governmental reforms and to silence critics.

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borders and establishing a closed market, that is, a market which would not be unified; and this is a dangerous thing." He went on to upbraid the developed republics--again without naming them--for their reluctance to continue to aid underdeveloped areas like Kosovo.

In his speech in the industrial town of Nis, Tito sought to quiet the dispute between the Serbs and Croats, who have been publicly arguing about the reforms, by advising them to keep their own republic houses in order and to leave federal problems to him. Thus he lectured that "each republic should orient itself toward its own problems and defeat the class enemy in its own environment, instead of looking to another republic while failing to see its own problems." He went on to point out to his Serbian audience that it was the LCY's task to "sort out certain things in order to separate the wolves from the sheep," and he concluded with the promise "we will do so."

In an apparent effort to convince party dissidents that Tito still has the support of the army, Radio Belgrade reported that the conference of the League of Communists of the Nis Army district has expressed "its full support for the constitutional amendments and welcomed President Tito's call for a session of the party Presidium to prevent irresponsible behavior."

CROATIAN PARTY STEPS UP CAMPAIGN FOR GREATER AUTONOMY

In apparent anticipation of an impending showdown between unitarian and autonomous-minded forces over the pending reforms, the Croatian party has intensified its campaign to marshal public opinion behind its efforts to use the reorganization to promote greater autonomy from Belgrade. Croatian party leaders have traveled throughout the republic making speeches explaining the constitutional amendments, defending their own positions, and attacking their opponents.

In a series of speeches and articles, Mika Tripalo, a member of the LCY Executive Bureau and party Presidium and Croatia's most articulate intellectual spokesman, has led the defense of the Croats' views on autonomy.

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In a speech delivered on 14 April and published in the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA on the 16th, as reviewed by TANJUG, Tripalo made a spirited defense of Croatia's right to arrange its own internal affairs without federal interference: "The question of how Croatia will be organized, either in the self-managing or statist manner, cannot be solved by anybody outside. This will be solved by the communists and working people in our republic."

Addressing a gathering at Imotsk on the 16th, Tripalo, as reported by Radio Belgrade, declared that "the Croatian leadership has persevered in its view primarily due to the broad public support of the masses, who have never before supported the policy of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia to such an extent." He went on to assert that this policy could not be shaken by the "latest attacks in the country and abroad." Hinting that those cadres who do not actively support the present leadership's policy may be replaced, he added: "The cadre policy in the Croatian party should be changed in order to put those young and educated people in the leading positions who fully adhere to the policy."

ROLE OF STATE Another area of dispute between the
SECURITY SERVICE Croats and the federal apparatus was
 reflected in a 15 April BORBA report
that some deputies in the Federal Assembly are "demanding
that the constitutional provisions concerning the work of
the State Security Service (SDB) be more clearly delimited."
BORBA added that the Internal Policy Committee of the
Federal Assembly's Social-Political Chamber "has taken
the view that the provisions of the constitutional
amendments are already 'outdated' following the recent
Ustashi terrorist attacks on our diplomatic mission in
Sweden."

The report went on to single out the Croatian delegate's request to the committee that, following the latest events, "the SDB be accorded special treatment in the constitution, a treatment which implies a reexamination of its cadre structure." He also suggested, the report said, that the SDB "should free itself of certain burdens of the past and should finally cease to be a monopoly of certain people." Although the BORBA report did not elaborate on the Croatian delegate's demands, their import

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seems to be that despite the ouster of pro-Rankovic elements from the SDB and the weakening of its functions in 1966, the SDB is still serving as a tool of pro-Serbian, centralist forces.

Croatian expressions of displeasure with the role of the SDB come against the background of the Croatian Central Committee charges in an 8 April communique that centralist elements in Yugoslavia and hostile foreign forces are trying to discredit its leadership by circulating allegations about "the supposed links of the Croatian leadership with Ustashi emigres." The communique further charged that these allegations are "being disseminated even through some organs of the Federal Administration."

Piro Pirker, secretary of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, in a speech in Zagreb on 16 April, commented that the assessments given in the Central Committee communique "have proven to be accurate." He added that "at the same time, it is now necessary to also take the next step which will be aimed at discovering the groups and personalities who are behind this dirty work."

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K O R E A

DPRK PROMISES ASSISTANCE TO DRV, RECALLS CHINESE PLEDGES

At the 12-14 April session of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), Foreign Minister Ho Tam reasserted Pyongyang's line on Asian communist unity, forcefully associating DPRK and DRV security interests while pointedly recalling Peking's commitments to Vietnam recorded in the joint communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi last month. As has been customary in Pyongyang's comment on Sino-Korean relations, Ho Tam also sought to link Chinese and North Korean vital interests.

The Chinese, who were hosting an American table tennis team at the time of the SPA session, offered editorial support only for proposals for Korean unification presented in Ho Tam's report. NCNA reported his statements regarding Vietnam but ignored those concerning Sino-Korean relations.

ASIAN In his 12 April report to the SPA "on the present
UNITY international situation and the promotion of the
independent unification of the fatherland," Ho Tam made an unusually strong pledge of assistance to the Vietnamese people in their anti-U.S. struggle. Noting that the DPRK Government and people regard U.S. "aggression" against Vietnam "as against themselves," Ho Tam went on to declare that the North Koreans have made "full preparations to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people at any time requested by the Government of the DRV," a statement which could be interpreted as a promise of volunteers. Later in his speech, Ho Tam declared that the Koreans "will take any measure at any time" if necessary to assist the Indochinese people.

Pyongyang was most explicit in offering volunteers to Vietnam in the mid-1960's before the bombing halt, but since then its pledges have been more generalized and rhetorical, promising to "fight shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese or Indochinese peoples on the "common front" against the "common enemy." In the period since the U.S. incursion into Cambodia a year ago, the Koreans are known to have termed U.S. action in Indochina as aggression "against themselves" only once before--in a 15 February NODONG SINMUN

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editorial denouncing the Laos operation. This claim was absent from the DPRK Government statement the same day on Laos, from the 14 December 1970 government statement supporting the DRV party-government appeal, and from the 4 May 1970 government statement on the Cambodian incursion. By closely associating North Korean interests with those of the Indochinese, this claim sharpens Pyongyang's line on Asian unity, which was authoritatively formulated by Kim Il-song when Sihanouk visited the DPRK in June following the April Indochina summit meeting and Chou En-lai's visit to Pyongyang. In the current speech Ho Tam once again quoted Kim's exhortation to "the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and all other revolutionary countries in Asia" to consolidate their "united front" and wage a "joint struggle" against U.S. imperialism.

Ho Tam cited the statements in the joint communique--released on 10 March--on Chou's visit to Hanoi declaring that U.S. escalation in Indochina "poses a grave menace" to the PRC and pledging that the Chinese will "take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices" to assist the Indochinese people in case of further escalation. The reference to Chinese security has not been repeated by Peking since, and the warning about national sacrifices appeared subsequently only in an 11 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on Chou's visit. Since then Peking has avoided linking its security with Indochinese developments while exuding confidence over the Indochinese situation.

While Pyongyang would be expected to reassert its line of Asian unity and aid to Vietnam in a major foreign policy statement, Ho Tam's recollection of the Chinese commitments to Vietnam, long after Peking had ceased repeating the stronger ones, may reflect concern over Peking's recent friendly gestures toward the United States and may be an effort to remind the Chinese of their anti-U.S. obligations. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that neither Pyongyang nor Hanoi has reported the visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC.

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Over the years Pyongyang has been in the forefront of the communist movement in demanding unity and firm backing for the Vietnamese. Its relations with Peking became severely strained in the second half of the 1960's as the Chinese placed their anti-Soviet vendetta above the demand for communist unity. Sino-Korean rapprochement in the past year or so has been based in large measure on Peking's renewed emphasis on Asian unity and its willingness to mute the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Vietnam context. Ho Tam voiced one theme of this rapprochement when he recalled that the Korean and Chinese people fought together against the Japanese and in the Korean War, adding that they are now fighting "shoulder to shoulder" against both "the U.S. imperialists" and "the Japanese militarists" in the spirit of their traditional friendship "sealed in blood." He also reiterated North Korean support for the Chinese effort to "liberate" Taiwan.

PEKING'S COVERAGE Peking's treatment of the SPA session exhibited reluctance to link its vital interests with those of the North Koreans, a caution that has been reflected in Peking's propaganda since last fall.* In the only editorial comment on the SPA session, a 15 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial limited itself to the issue of Korean unification, playing up Ho Tam's reiteration of Pyongyang's proposals for unification while ignoring the other foreign policy aspects of the report. The editorial said that the Chinese people "resolutely support" the North Korean program for "the peaceful unification of their fatherland."** (Peking repeated this expression of support

* Chinese caution was shown in propaganda last October on the signing of aid agreements with the DPRK and on the anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) into the Korean War. See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 26 October 1970, and the TRENDS of 28 October, pages 25-29.

** Peking's reference to "peaceful" unification of Korea in commenting on the SPA session again revived its use of that modifier. Last fall, as if to underscore its counsel of caution to the North Koreans at that time, Peking's comment on the anniversary of the CPV entry into the Korean War had for the first time since 1966 called for "peaceful" unification. The CCP greetings to the KWP Congress last November did likewise, but thereafter Peking avoided the modifier when referring to Korean unification.

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for the Korean program of "peaceful unification" in a 21 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the anniversary of the South Korean ouster of Syngman Rhee.) Also on the 15th NCNA promptly reported a NHAN DAN article on the SPA session which supported the program for "peaceful unification" but which inexplicably ignored Ho Tam's promises of assistance for Vietnam.

Although on 13 and 14 April Peking briefly reported the opening and closing of the SPA session, Peking waited until 17 April, two days after the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and five days after Ho Tam's report, before carrying an account of the report as a whole. NCNA's summary stressed the section on "peaceful unification" and gave short shrift to the other foreign policy issues. NCNA reported his warning that the DPRK has made preparations to "fight shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese whenever requested by the DRV Government, but it omitted the assertion that aggression against the DRV is regarded as aggression against the DPRK. While NCNA duly reported Ho Tam's citation of the Chinese formulations used during Chou's visit to Hanoi, it suppressed his assertions associating Chinese and Korean security interests.

Also on the 17th, NCNA reported the statement on Indochina adopted at the SPA session and disseminated by NCNA on the 14th. NCNA's report included the portions repeating Ho Tam's formulations regarding North Korean assistance to the Vietnamese and claiming that aggression against Vietnam was aggression against the DPRK.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PURGED TAO CHU AIDE NAMED SECRETARY ON SHANSI COMMITTEE

Formation of a provincial party committee for Shansi was announced by NCNA on 16 April, the third such committee to be formed in April and the 19th since the first was formed last December. In Shansi, as happened in Shantung last week, the chairman of the revolutionary committee was not made first secretary, and seems to be out of the picture completely.

Both Shansi and Shantung, model provinces in early 1967 when revolutionary committees were first being established, were subsequently plagued by factional strife; neither provincial head has appeared publicly since 1969. Shansi chief Liu Ko-ping had been a party secretary and vice-governor in Shansi prior to the cultural revolution; of Muslim origin, he was first secretary in Ningsia and a regime spokesman on minority issues in the 1950's.

The formation of party committees for Shansi and Shantung, provinces with a history of factionalism necessitating new chiefs, suggests that the center is determined to press rather quickly toward completion of the party reconstruction process whatever may be the difficulties. Apart from more remote, heavily minority areas, only Heilungkiang, Szechwan, Hopei, and Tientsin remain without party committees.

FIRST A standing committee of 14 was elected for
SECRETARY Shansi, and of these four were named secretaries.
 The first secretary is Hsueh Chen-hua, commander
of the military district and vice-chairman of the Shansi
Revolutionary Committee since 1967. He is the only provincial
first secretary not a member of the Central Committee. The
other military man made secretary is Tsao Chung-nan, a
responsible person of the military district who was identified
as a revolutionary committee vice-chairman last November.
The only secretary to carry over from the original Shansi list
of vice-chairmen is Chen Yung-kuei, head of the model Tachai
production brigade and a full member of the Central Committee.
Apparently he managed to stay out of the factional strife
that tore through the leadership in 1967 and 1968.

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The other secretary is Chang Ping-hua, former first secretary of Hunan during Tao Chu's reign in the Central-South Bureau; he assumed the concomitant post of deputy director of propaganda during Tao's brief ascendancy in Peking in late 1966. Chang came under attack by Red Guards in October 1966, shortly after his last public appearance in Changsha for National Day. Red Guard sources indicated that he was protected by Tao against charges that he had mishandled the revolution in Hunan, but after Tao's fall he was criticized on these grounds and also for being an agent of Tao and of Wang Jen-chung, Tao's successor as Central-South chief. Chang was associated with Wang Jen-chung for many years in Hupeh before his assignment to Hunan.

Chang's reappearance as the first of Tao Chu's lieutenants to be rehabilitated is doubly surprising in view of Chiang Ching's apparent animosity toward him. According to a Red Guard account, Chiang denounced him on 31 March 1968 at a meeting of central leaders and members of the Hunan revolutionary committee preparatory group. She stated that Chang had opposed Lin Piao in the Northeast and "is incorrigible; he will remain unrepentant until death. I hate him whenever I think of him." Blaming Chang for the fact that the HUNAN DAILY was the only provincial paper not to carry Yao Wen-yuan's opening blast of the cultural revolution, On "Hai Jui's Dismissal from Office", Chiang recalled, "I have old scores to settle with him; I shall always remember that." Chang's reappearance thus raises some question as to Chiang's present influence, especially in view of the concurrent decline of her former allies Chen Po-⁴a and Kang Sheng.

CROP DIVERSIFICATION CAMPAIGN STRESSES HIGHER YIELDS

Throughout the year, Peking's agricultural propaganda has stressed, presumably in compliance with the new 5-year plan, that grain cultivation by itself is not sufficient; while grain must remain the "key link," other crops must be encouraged. This position marks a turnabout from recent years when the merits of secondary crops were mentioned briefly if at all. Currently, as the planting season draws to a close, PRC media have intensified the campaign, claiming that production of other crops will in fact improve grain harvests. The argument seems to be aimed primarily at reluctant lower-level cadres who fear the consequences of a decline in grain harvests.

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A model for the persuasive approach was a 30 March NCNA article which sought to resolve the "contradictions" between emphasis on grain and on suitable local crops. A Shansi brigade is said to have used saline land to grow beets, which are salt-resistant. Their stems and leaves and the sugar-processing refuse can feed hogs, and hog manure stimulates both grain and beet production. A similar argument was provided in an article by the joint writing group of the ministries of agriculture and forestry, light industry, and commerce that advocated more cotton production. The article stated that "as proved by facts a bumper harvest of grain can provide favorable conditions for cotton production, and the development of cotton production can assist in promoting grain production."

Leftist impulses on the part of lower-level cadres eager to gain favor apparently continue to impede the center's plans. An article broadcast by Shansi radio on 4 April noted that some brigade-level cadres felt it was dangerous to grasp sideline production and did away with it. Others "blindly reduced the area of growing vegetables," or violated party policy by proposing that pigs should be raised only by the collective--a line completely at variance with Peking's line over the past 2 years that pig-raising should be encouraged under almost any circumstances.

A Sian article broadcast on 8 April made yet another appeal for diversity with the claim that lack of diversity in planting results not only in less grain production but also in lower peasant income. As evidence that grain production and diversification are complementary, the article joined Marxism to traditional Chinese thought in order to present the analogy of a dialectical relationship between them "similar to that between wood and steel." In a less esoteric vein, the article also noted that development of sideline production and a diversified agricultural economy "will provide more capital and manure for grain production." The article pointed to one brigade that had stressed only grain for several years and "consequently could not provide the necessary capital to develop either general production" or grain production.

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Han Hsien-chu's report at the Fukien party congress, summarized by Foochow radio on 8 April, sounded similar themes on the necessity for all-round development. Han also indicated that two goals frequently discussed in PRC media in the past have been made formal goals of the new 5-year plan. He stated that "during the fourth 5-year plan" the target of one mou of farmland per person, with a stable high yield, in time of drought or flood, should be achieved. The second target is for one pig per person and per mou of farmland, a ratio sought since the days of the "great leap forward."

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